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Financial institutions are increasingly measuring and man-
aging the risk from credit exposures at the portfolio level,
in addition to the transaction level. This change in per-
spective has occurred for a number of reasons. First is the
recognition that the traditional binary classification of
credits into “good” credits and “bad” credits is not suffi-
cient—a precondition for managing credit risk at the port-
folio level is the recognition that all credits can potentially
become “bad” over time given a particular economic sce-
nario. The second reason is the declining profitability of
traditional credit products, implying little room for error
in terms of the selection and pricing of individual transac-
tions, or for portfolio decisions, where diversification and
timing effects increasingly mean the difference between
profit and loss. Finally, management has more opportuni-
ties to manage exposure proactively after it has been origi-
nated, with the increased liquidity in the secondary loan
market, the increased importance of syndicated lending,
the availability of credit derivatives and third-party guar-
antees, and so on.
In order to take advantage of credit portfolio
management opportunities, however, management must
first answer several technical questions: What is the risk
of a given portfolio? How do different macroeconomic
scenarios, at both the regional and the industry sector
level, affect the portfolio’s risk profile? What is the effect of
changing the portfolio mix? How might risk-based pricing
at the individual contract and the portfolio level be influ-
enced by the level of expected losses and credit risk capital?
This paper describes a new and intuitive method
for answering these technical questions by tabulating the
exact loss distribution arising from correlated credit events
for any arbitrary portfolio of counterparty exposures, down
to the individual contract level, with the losses measured
on a marked-to-market basis that explicitly recognises the
potential impact of defaults and credit migrations.1 The
importance of tabulating the exact loss distribution is
highlighted by the fact that counterparty defaults and rat-
ing migrations cannot be predicted with perfect foresight
and are not perfectly correlated, implying that manage-
ment faces a distribution of potential losses rather than a
single potential loss. In order to define credit risk more
precisely in the context of loss distributions, the financial
industry is converging on risk measures that summarise
management-relevant aspects of the entire loss distribu- Thomas C. Wilson is a principal of McKinsey and Company.72 FRBNY ECONOMIC POLICY REVIEW / OCTOBER 1998
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tion. Two distributional statistics are becoming increas-
ingly relevant for measuring credit risk: expected losses
and a critical value of the loss distribution, often defined as
the portfolio’s credit risk capital (CRC). Each of these
serves a distinct and useful role in supporting management
decision making and control (Exhibit 1).
Expected losses, illustrated as the mean of the distri-
bution, often serve as the basis for management’s reserve
policies: the higher the expected losses, the higher the
reserves required. As such, expected losses are also an
important component in determining whether the pricing
of the credit-risky position is adequate: normally, each
transaction should be priced with sufficient margin to
cover its contribution to the portfolio’s expected credit
losses, as well as other operating expenses.
Credit risk capital, defined as the maximum loss
within a known confidence interval (for example, 99 percent)
over an orderly liquidation period, is often interpreted as
the additional economic capital that must be held against a
given portfolio, above and beyond the level of credit
reserves, in order to cover its unexpected credit losses.
Since it would be uneconomic to hold capital against all
potential losses (this would imply that equity is held
against 100 percent of all credit exposures), some level of
capital must be chosen to support the portfolio of transac-
tions in most, but not all, cases. As with expected losses,
CRC also plays an important role in determining whether
the credit risk of a particular transaction is appropriately
priced: typically, each transaction should be priced with
sufficient margin to cover not only its expected losses, but
also the cost of its marginal risk capital contribution.
In order to tabulate these loss distributions, most
industry professionals split the challenge of credit risk
measurement into two questions: First, what is the joint
probability of a credit event occurring? And second, what
would be the loss should such an event occur?
In terms of the latter question, measuring poten-
tial losses given a credit event is a straightforward exercise
for many standard commercial banking products. The
exposure of a $100 million unsecured loan, for example, is
roughly $100 million, subject to any recoveries. For derivatives
portfolios or committed but unutilised lines of credit, how-
ever, answering this question is more difficult. In this
paper, we focus on the former question, that is, how to model
the joint probability of defaults across a portfolio. Those
interested in the complexities of exposure measurement for
derivative and commercial banking products are referred to
J.P. Morgan (1997), Lawrence (1995), and Rowe (1995).
The approach developed here for measuring
expected and unexpected losses differs from other
approaches in several important respects. First, it mod-
els the actual, discrete loss distribution, depending on
the number and size of credits, as opposed to using a
normal distribution or mean-variance approximations.
This is important because with one large exposure the
portfolio’s loss distribution is discrete and bimodal, as
opposed to continuous and unimodal; it is highly
skewed, as opposed to symmetric; and finally, its shape
changes dramatically as other positions are added.
Because of this, the typical measure of unexpected losses
used, standard deviations, is like a “rubber ruler”: it can
be used to give a sense of the uncertainty of loss, but its
actual interpretation in terms of dollars at risk depends
on the degree to which the ruler has been “stretched” by
diversification or large exposure effects. In contrast, the
model developed here explicitly tabulates the actual,FRBNY ECONOMIC POLICY REVIEW / OCTOBER 1998 73
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discrete loss distribution for any given portfolio, thus
also allowing explicit and accurate tabulation of a “large
exposure premium” in terms of the risk-adjusted capital
needed to support less-diversified portfolios.
Second, the losses (or gains) are measured on a
default/no-default basis for credit exposures that cannot be
liquidated (for example, most loans or over-the-counter
trading exposure lines) as well as on a theoretical marked-
to-market basis for those that can be liquidated prior to the
maximum maturity of the exposure. In addition, the distri-
bution of average write-offs for retail portfolios is also
modeled. This implies that the approach can integrate the
credit risk arising from liquid secondary market positions
and illiquid commercial positions, as well as retail portfolios
such as mortgages and overdrafts. Since most banks are
active in all three of these asset classes, this integration is an
important first step in determining the institution’s overall
capital adequacy.
Third, and most importantly, the tabulated loss
distributions are driven by the state of the economy, rather
than based on unconditional or twenty-year averages that
do not reflect the portfolio’s true current risk. This allows
the model to capture the cyclical default effects that deter-
mine the lion’s share of the risk for diversified portfolios.
Our research shows that the bulk of the systematic or non-
diversifiable risk of any portfolio can be “explained” by the
economic cycle. Leveraging this fact is not only intuitive,
but it also leads to powerful management insights on the
true risk of a portfolio.
Finally, specific country and industry influences
are explicitly recognised using empirical relationships,
which enable the model to mimic the actual default corre-
lations between industries and regions at the transaction
and the portfolio level. Other models, including many
developed in-house, rely on a single systematic risk factor
to capture default correlations; our approach is based on a
true multi-factor systematic risk model, which reflects
reality better.
The model itself, described in greater detail in
McKinsey (1998) and Wilson (1997a, 1997b), consists of
two important components, each of which is discussed in
greater detail below. The first is a multi-factor model of sys-
tematic default risk. This model is used to simulate jointly
the conditional, correlated, average default, and credit
migration probabilities for each individual country/indus-
try/rating segment. These average segment default proba-
bilities are made conditional on the current state of the
economy and incorporate industry sensitivities (for example,
“high-beta” industries such as construction react more to
cyclical changes) based on aggregate historical relationships.
The second is a method for tabulating the discrete loss dis-
tribution for any portfolio of credit exposures—liquid and
nonliquid, constant and nonconstant, diversified and non-
diversified. This is achieved by convoluting the conditional,
marginal loss distributions of the individual positions to
develop the aggregate loss distribution, with default corre-
lations between different counterparties determined by the
systematic risk driving the correlated average default rates.
SYSTEMATIC RISK MODEL
In developing this model for systematic or nondiversifiable
credit risk, we leveraged five intuitive observations that
credit professionals very often take for granted.
First, that diversification helps to reduce loss uncer-
tainty, all else being equal. Second, that substantial systematic
or nondiversifiable risk nonetheless remains for even the most
diversified portfolios. This second observation is illustrated by
the “Actual” line plotted in Exhibit 2, which represents the
average default rate for all German corporations over the74 FRBNY ECONOMIC POLICY REVIEW / OCTOBER 1998
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Note:  The factor 2 band for Japan is 79.7; the factor 3 band for the
United Kingdom is 82.1.
1960-94 period; the variation or volatility of this series can be
interpreted as the systematic or nondiversifiable risk of the
“German” economy, arguably a very diversified portfolio.
Third, that this systematic portfolio risk is driven largely by
the “health” of the macroeconomy—in recessions, one expects
defaults to increase.
The relationship between changes in average
default rates and the state of the macroeconomy is also
illustrated in Exhibit 2, which plots the actual default
rate for the German economy against the predicted
default rate, with the prediction equation based solely
upon macroeconomic aggregates such as GDP growth
and unemployment rates. As the exhibit shows, the
macroeconomic factors explain much of the overall vari-
ation in the average default rate series, reflected in the
regression equation’s R2 of more than 90 percent for
most of the countries investigated (for example, Ger-
many, the United States, the United Kingdom, Japan,
Switzerland, Spain, Sweden, Belgium, and France). The
fourth observation is that different sectors of the econ-
omy react differently to macroeconomic shocks, albeit
with different economic drivers: U.S. corporate insol-
vency rates are heavily influenced by interest rates, the
Swedish paper and pulp industry by the real terms of
trade, and retail mortgages by house prices and regional
economic indicators. While all of these examples are
intuitive, it is sometimes surprising how strong our
intuition is when put to statistical tests. For example,
the intuitive expectation that the construction sector
would be more adversely affected during a recession
than most other sectors is supported by the data for all
of the different countries analysed.
Exhibit 3 illustrates the need for a multi-factor
model, as opposed to a single-factor model, for systematic
risk. Performing a principal-components analysis of the
country average default rates, a good surrogate for sys-
tematic risk by country, it emerges that the first “factor”
captures only 77.5 percent of the total variation in sys-
tematic default rates for Moody’s and the U.S., U.K.,
Japanese, and German markets. This corresponds to the
amount of systematic risk “captured” by most single-
factor models; the rest of the variation is implicitly
assumed to be independent and uncorrelated. Unfortu-
nately, the first factor explains only 23.9 percent of the
U.S. systematic risk index, 56.2 percent for the United
Kingdom, and 66.8 percent for Germany. The exhibit
demonstrates that the substantial correlation remaining
is explained by the second and third factors, explaining
an additional 10.2 percent and 6.8 percent, respectively,
of the total variation and the bulk of the risk for the
United States, the United Kingdom, and Germany. This
demonstrates that a single-factor systematic risk model
like one based on asset betas or aggregate Moody’s/Stan-
dard and Poor’s data alone is not sufficient to capture all
correlations accurately. The final observation is also
both intuitive and empirically verifiable: that rating
migrations are also linked to the macroeconomy—not
only is default more likely during a recession, but credit
downgrades are also more likely.
When we formulate each of these intuitive observa-
tions into a rigorous statistical model that we can estimate, the
net result is a multi-factor statistical model for systematic
credit risk that we can then simulate for every country/indus-
try/rating segment in our sample. This is demonstrated in
Exhibit 4, where we plot the simulated cumulative default
rates for a German, single-A-rated, five-year exposure based on
current economic conditions in Germany.FRBNY ECONOMIC POLICY REVIEW / OCTOBER 1998 75
Exhibit 4
Simulated Default Probabilities


































1. Determine state 2. Determine segment probability of default 3. Determine loss distributions
LOSS TABULATION METHODS
While these distributions of correlated, average default
probabilities by country, sector, rating, and maturity are
interesting, we still need a method of explicitly tabulat-
ing the loss distribution for any arbitrary portfolio of
credit risk exposures. So we now turn to developing an
efficient method for tabulating the loss distribution for
any arbitrary portfolio, capable of handling portfolios
with large, undiversified positions and/or diversified
portfolios; portfolios with nonconstant exposures, such
as those found in derivatives trading books, and/or con-
stant exposures, such as those found in commercial lend-
ing books; and portfolios comprising liquid, credit-
risky positions, such as secondary market debt, or loans
and/or illiquid exposures that must be held to maturity,
such as some commercial loans or trading lines. Below,
we demonstrate how to tabulate the loss distributions
for the simplest case (for example, constant exposures,
nondiscounted losses) and then build upon the simplest
case to handle more complex cases (for example, noncon-
stant exposures, discounted losses, liquid positions, and
retail portfolios). Exhibit 5 provides an abstract time-
line for tabulating the overall portfolio loss distribu-
tion. The first two steps relate to the systematic risk
model and the third represents loss tabulations.
Time is divided into discrete periods, indexed by
t. During each period, a sequence of three steps occurs:
first, the state of the economy is determined by simula-
tion; second, the conditional migration and cumulative
default probabilities for each country/industry segment76 FRBNY ECONOMIC POLICY REVIEW / OCTOBER 1998
are determined based on the equations estimated earlier;
and, finally, the actual defaults for the portfolio are deter-
mined by sampling from the relevant distribution of seg-
ment-specific simulated default rates. Exhibit 6 gives
figures for the highly stylised single-period, two-segment
numerical example described below.
1. Determine the state: For any given period, the first
step is to determine the state of the world, that is, the health
of the macroeconomy. In this simple example, three possible
states of the economy can occur: an economic “expansion”
(with GDP growth of +1 percent), an “average” year (with
GDP growth of 0 percent), and an economic “recession”
(with GDP growth of -1 percent). Each of these states can
occur with equal probability (33.33 percent) in this numeri-
cal sample.
2. Determine segment probability of default: The sec-
ond step is to then translate the state of the world into con-
ditional probabilities of default for each customer segment
based on the estimated relationships described earlier. In
this example, there are two counterparty segments, a “low-
beta” segment, whose probability of default reacts less
strongly to macroeconomic fluctuations (with a range of
2.50 percent to 4.71 percent), and a “high-beta” segment,
which reacts quite strongly to macroeconomic fluctuations
(with a range of 0.75 percent to 5.25 percent).
3. Determine loss distributions: We now tabulate the
(nondiscounted) loss distribution for portfolios that are
constant over their life, cannot be liquidated, and have
known recovery rates, including both diversified and non-
diversified positions. Later, we relax each of these assump-
tions within the framework of this model in order to
estimate more accurately the expected losses and risk capi-
tal from credit events.
The conditional loss distribution in the simple
two-counterparty, three-state numerical example is tabu-
lated by recognising that there are three independent
“draws,” or states of the economy and that, conditional on
each of these states, there are only four possible default sce-
narios: A defaults, B defaults, A+B defaults, or no one
defaults (Exhibit 7).
The conditional probability of each of these loss
events for each state of the economy is calculated by convo-
luting each position’s individual loss distribution for each
state. Thus, the conditional probability of a $200 loss in
the expansion state is 0.01 percent, whereas the uncondi-
tional probability of achieving the same loss given the
entire distribution of future economic states (expansion,
average, recession) is 0.1 percent after rounding errors. For
this example, the expected portfolio loss is $6.50 and the
credit risk capital is $100, since this is the maximum
potential loss within a 99 percent confidence interval
across all possible future states of the economy.
Our calculation method is based on the assump-
tion that all default correlations are caused by the corre-
lated segment-specific default indices. That is, no further
information beyond country, industry, rating, and the state
of the economy is useful in terms of predicting the default
correlation between any two counterparties. To underscore
this point, suppose that management is confronted with
two single-A-rated counterparties in the German construc-
tion industry with the prospect of either a recession or an
economic expansion in the near future. Using the tradi-
tional approach, which ignores the impact of the economy
in determining default probabilities, we would conclude
that the counterparty default rates were correlated. Using
our approach, we observe that, in a recession, the probabil-
ity of default for both counterparties is significantly higher
than during an expansion and that their joint conditional
probability of default is therefore also higher, leading to
correlated defaults. However, because we assume that all
idiosyncratic or nonsystematic risks can be diversified
Exhibit 6
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away, no other information beyond the counterparties’
country, industry, and rating (for example, the counterpar-
ties’ segmentation criteria) is useful in determining their
joint default correlation. This assumption is made implic-
itly by other models, but ours extends the standard single-
factor approach to a multi-factor approach that better cap-
tures country- and industry-specific shocks.
Intuitively, we should be able to diversify away all
idiosyncratic risk, leaving only systematic, nondiversifiable
risk. More succinctly, as we diversify our holdings within a
particular segment, that segment’s loss distribution will con-
verge to the loss distribution implied by the segment index.
This logic is consistent with other single- or multi-factor
models in finance, such as the capital asset pricing model.
Our multi-factor model for systematic default
risks is qualitatively similar, except that there is no single
risk factor. Rather, there are multiple factors that fully
describe the complex correlation structure between coun-
tries, industries, and ratings. In our simple numerical
example, for a well-diversified portfolio consisting of a
large number of counterparties in each segment (the NA &
NB = Infinity case), all idiosyncratic risk per segment is
diversified away, leaving only the systematic risk per seg-
ment (Exhibit 8).
In other words, because of the law of large num-
bers, the actual loss distribution for the portfolio will con-
verge to the expected loss for each state of the world,
implying that the unconditional loss distribution has only
three possible outcomes, representing each of the three
states of the world, each occurring with equal probability
and with a loss per segment consistent with the conditional
probability of loss for that segment given that state of the
economy. While the expected losses from the portfolio
would remain constant, this remaining systematic risk would
generate a CRC value of only $9.96 for the $200 million
exposure in this simple example, demonstrating both the
benefit to be derived from portfolio diversification and the
fact that not all systematic risk can be diversified away.
In the second case (labeled  NA = 1 & NB = Infin-
ity), all of the idiosyncratic risk is diversified away within
segment B, leaving only the systematic risk component for
segment B. The segment A position, however, still con-
tains idiosyncratic risk, since it comprises only a single risk
position. Thus, for each state of the economy, two outcomes
Exhibit 7
NUMERICAL EXAMPLE: TWO EXPOSURES
1. Determine state
2. Determine segment probability of default
3. Determine loss distributions
Expansion Average Recession
Loss Distribution A B A+B
Probability of 
Default (Percent) A B A+B
Probability of 
Default (Percent) A B A+B
Probability of 
Default (Percent)
-100 -100 -200 0.01 -100 -100 -200 0.03 -100 -100 -200 0.08
-100 0 -100 0.83 -100 0 -100 0.96 -100 0 -100 1.49
0 -100 -100 0.24 0 -100 -100 1.12 0 -100 -100 1.67
0 0 0 32.36 0 0 0 31.23 0 0 0 30.10
Correlation (A,B) = 0 percent Correlation (A,B) = 0 percent Correlation (A,B) = 0 percent
Conditional correlation (A,B) = 1 percent78 FRBNY ECONOMIC POLICY REVIEW / OCTOBER 1998
are possible: either the counterparty in segment A goes bank-
rupt or it does not; the unconditional probability that coun-
terparty A will default in the economic expansion state is 0.83
percent (33.33 percent probability that the expansion state
occurs multiplied by a 2.5 percent probability of default for a
segment A counterparty given that state). Regardless of
whether or not counterparty A goes into default, the segment
B position losses will be known with certainty, given the state
of the economy, since all idiosyncratic risk within that seg-
ment has been diversified away.
To illustrate the results using our simulation
model, suppose that we had equal $100, ten-year exposures
to single-A-rated counterparties in each of five country
segments—Germany, France, Spain, the United States, and
the United Kingdom—at the beginning of 1996. The
aggregate simulated loss distribution for this portfolio of
diversified country positions, conditional on the then-cur-
rent macroeconomic scenarios for the different countries at
the end of 1995, is given in the left panel of Exhibit 9.
The impact of introducing one large, undiversified
exposure into the same portfolio is illustrated in the right
panel of Exhibit 9. Here, we take the same five-country
portfolio of diversified index positions used in the left
panel, but add a single, large, undiversified position to the
“other” country’s position.
The impact of this new, large concentration risk is
clear. The loss distribution becomes “bimodal,” reflecting the
fact that, for each state of the world, two events might occur:
either the large counterparty will go bankrupt, generating a
“cloud” of portfolio loss events centered around -140, or the
undiversified position will not go bankrupt, generating a sim-
ilar cloud of loss events centered around -40, but with higher
probability. This risk concentration disproportionately
increases the amount of risk capital needed to support the
portfolio from $61.6 to $140.2, thereby demonstrating the
large-exposure risk capital premium needed to support the
addition of large, undiversified exposures.
The calculations above illustrate how to tabulate
the (nondiscounted) loss distributions for nonliquid portfo-
lios with constant exposures. While useful in many
instances, these portfolio characteristics differ from reality in
two important ways. First, the potential exposure profiles
generated by trading products are typically not constant (as
pointed out by Lawrence [1995] and Rowe [1995]). Second,
the calculations ignore the time value of money, so that a
potential loss in the future is somehow “less painful” in
terms of today’s value than a loss today.
In reality, the amount of potential economic loss in
the event of default varies over time, due to discounting,
or nonconstant exposures, or both. This can be seen in
Exhibit 10. If the counterparty were to go into default
sometime during the second year, the present value of the
portfolio’s loss would be $50 in the case of nonconstant
exposures and $100*  in the case of discounted
exposures, as opposed to $100 and $100*  if the coun-
terparty had gone into default sometime during the first year.
Unlike the case of constant, nondiscounted exposures, where
the timing of the default is inconsequential, nonconstant
exposures or discounting of the losses implies that the timing
of the default is critical for tabulating the economic loss.
er – 2*2 ()
er – 1*1 ()
Exhibit 8
NUMERICAL EXAMPLE: DIVERSIFIED EXPOSURES
1. Determine state
2. Determine segment probability of default
3. Determine loss distributions
NA & NB = Infinity NA =1 & NB = Infinity
Loss Probability  of Loss Probability  of 
A B A+B Default (Percent) A B A+B Default (Percent)
Expansion -2.50 -0.75 -3.25 33.33 Expansion -100 -0.75 -100.75 0.83
Average -2.97 -3.45 -6.42 33.33 0 -0.75 -0.75 32.50
Recession -4.71 -5.25 -9.96 33.33 Average -100 -3.45 -103.45 0.99
Unconditional correlation (A, B) 91.00 0 -3.45 -3.45 32.30
Credit RAC = 9.96 Recession -100 -5.25 -105.25 1.57
0 -5.25 -5.25 31.80
Credit RAC = 105.25FRBNY ECONOMIC POLICY REVIEW / OCTOBER 1998 79
Exhibit 10
Nonconstant or Discounted Exposures







Default, year two    
Default, year one          
No default
Default, year three
ar1 is the continuously compounded, per annum zero coupon discount rate.
Exposure Loss Profile
Exhibit 9
Examples of Portfolio Loss Distributions
Portfolio Loss Distribution
Probability
Note:  Business unit, book, country, rating, maturity, exposure.
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Addressing both of these issues requires us to work
with marginal, as opposed to cumulative, default probabilities.
Whereas the cumulative default probability is the aggregate
probability of observing a default in any of the previous
years, the marginal default probability is the probability of
observing a loss in each specific year, given that the default
has not already occurred in a previous period.
Exhibit 11 illustrates the impact of nonconstant
loss exposures in terms of tabulating loss distributions.
With constant, nondiscounted exposures, the loss distribu-
tion for a single exposure is bimodal. Either it goes into
default at some time during its maturity, with a cumula-
tive default probability covering the entire three-year
period equal to   in the exhibit, implying a loss of
100, or it does not. If the exposure is nonconstant, how-
p1 p2 p3 ++
ever, you stand to lose a different amount depending upon
the exact timing of the default event. In the above exam-
ple, you would lose 100 with probability  , the marginal
probability that the counterparty goes into default during
the first year; 50 with probability  , the marginal proba-
bility that the counterparty goes into default during the
second year; and so on.
So far, we have been simulating only the cumu-
lative default probabilities. Tabulating the marginal
default probabilities from the cumulative is a straight-
forward exercise. Once this has been done, the portfolio
loss distribution can be tabulated by convoluting the
individual loss distributions, as described earlier. The
primary difference between our model and other models
is that we explicitly recognise that loss distributions for
nonconstant exposure profiles are not binomial but mul-
tinomial, recognising the fact that the timing of default
is also important in terms of tabulating the position’s
marginal loss distribution.
LIQUID OR TRADABLE POSITIONS AND/OR 
ONE-YEAR MEASUREMENT HORIZONS
So far, we have also assumed that the counterparty expo-
sure must be held until maturity and that it cannot be
liquidated at a “fair” price prior to maturity; under such
p1
p280 FRBNY ECONOMIC POLICY REVIEW / OCTOBER 1998
Exhibit 11
Nonconstant or Discounted Exposures









Default, year two  p2       
Default, year one  p1              
No default  1-p1-p2-p3
Default, year three  p3
Exposure Profile
1-p1-p2-p3
-100 0 -100 0 -50 -25
1-p1-p2-p3
Constant Exposure Nonconstant Exposure
p1 p2 p3 p1+p2+p3
circumstances, allocating capital and reserves to cover
potential losses over the life of the asset may make sense.
Such circumstances often arise in intransparent segments
where the market may perceive the originator of the credit
to have superior information, thereby reducing the market
price below the underwriter’s perceived “fair” value. For
some other asset classes, however, this assumption is inade-
quate for two reasons:
• Many financial institutions are faced with the increas-
ing probability that a bond name will also show up in
their loan portfolio. So they want to measure the
credit risk contribution arising from their secondary
bond trading operations and integrate it into an over-
all credit portfolio perspective.
• Liquid secondary markets are emerging, especially in
the rated corporate segments.
In both cases, management is presented with two
specific measurement challenges. First, as when measuring
market risk capital or value at risk, management must
decide on the appropriate time horizon over which to mea-
sure the potential loss distribution. In the previous illiquid
asset class examples, the relevant time horizon coincided
with the maximum maturity of the exposure, based on the
assumption that management could not liquidate the posi-
tion prior to its expiration. As markets become more liq-
uid, the appropriate time horizons may be asset-dependent
and determined by the asset’s orderly liquidation period.
The second challenge arises in regard to tabulating
the marked-to-market value losses for liquid assets should
a credit event occur. So far, we have defined the loss distri-
bution only in terms of default events (although default
probabilities have been tabulated using rating migrations
as well). However, it is clear that if the position can be liq-
uidated prior to its maturity, then other credit events (such
as credit downgrades and upgrades) will affect its marked-
to-market value at any time prior to its ultimate maturity.
For example, if you lock in a single-A-rated spread and the
credit rating of the counterparty decreases to a triple-B,
you suffer an economic loss, all else being equal: while the
market demands a higher, triple-B-rated spread, your com-
mitment provides only a lower, single-A-rated spread.
In order to calculate the marked-to-market loss
distribution for positions that can be liquidated prior to
their maturity, we therefore need to modify our approach
in two important ways. First, we need not only simulate
the cumulative default probabilities for each rating class,
but also their migration probabilities. This is straightfor-
ward, though memory-intensive. Complicating this calcu-
lation, however, is the fact that if the time horizons are
different for different asset classes, a continuum of rating
migration probabilities might need to be calculated, one
for each possible maturity or liquidation period. To reduce
the complexity of the task, we tabulate migration probabil-
ities for yearly intervals only and make the expedient
assumption that the rating migration probabilities for any
liquidation horizon that falls between years can be approxi-
mated by some interpolation rule.
Second, and more challenging, we need to be able
to tabulate the change in marked-to-market value of the
exposure for each possible change in credit rating. In the
case of traded loans or debt, a pragmatic approach is simply
to define a table of average credit spreads based on current
market conditions, in basis points per annum, as a function of
rating and the maturity of the underlying exposure. The
potential loss (or gain) from a credit migration can then be
tabulated by calculating the change in marked-to-market
value of the exposure due to the changing of the discount rate









1.3 0.8 0.4 0 -0.4 -0.8 -1.3 -30.7
The results of applying this approach are illus-
trated in Exhibit 12, which tabulates the potential profit
and loss profile from a single traded credit exposure,
originally rated triple-B, which can be liquidated prior
to one year. For this example, we have used a recovery
rate of 69.3 percent, a proxy for the average recovery rate
for senior secured credits rated triple-B. Inspection of
Exhibit 12 shows that it is inappropriate to talk about “loss
distributions” in the context of marked-to-market loan or
debt securities, since a profit or gain in marked-to-market
value can also be created by an improvement in the coun-
terparty’s credit standing.
Although this approach allows us to capture the
impact of credit migrations while holding the level of
interest rates and spreads constant, it must be seen as a
complement to a market risk measurement system that
accurately captures the potential profit-or-loss impact of
changing interest rate and average credit spread levels. If
your market risk measurement system does not capture
these risks, then a more complicated approach could be
used, such as jointly simulating interest rate levels, average
credit spread levels, and credit rating migrations.
RETAIL PORTFOLIOS
Tabulating the losses from retail mortgage, credit card,
and overdraft portfolios proceeds along similar lines.
However, for such portfolios, which are often character-
ised by large numbers of relatively small, homogeneous
exposures, it is frequently expedient to simulate directly
the average loss or write-off rate for the portfolio under
different macroeconomic scenarios based on similar,
estimated equations as those described earlier, rather
than migration probabilities for each individual obligor.
Once simulated, the loss contribution under a given
macroeconomic scenario for the first year is calculated as
, for the second year as  ,
and so on, where   and   are the average simulated
write-off rates and loan equivalent exposures for year i,
respectively.
A bank’s aggregate loss distribution across its total
portfolio of liquid, illiquid, and retail assets can be tabu-
lated by applying the appropriate loss tabulation method
to each asset class.
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